The vast majority of scholarly efforts to reform copyright start from the supposition that the scope of protection for works of authorship has become overbroad.1 However, while there is general consensus on the broad contours of the problem, there is far less agreement on how to solve it.
The attraction of the proposal to raise the originality threshold is that it promises to nip the problem in the bud, at the level of the subject matter definition. That is, rather than struggling to regulate innumerable and wildly varying works that all meet the minimum requirement for copyright protection, raising the originality threshold restrains the amount of works eligible for copyright in the first place. Thus, Joseph Scott Miller notes that many other proposals to restrict the scope of copyright have an “en- forcement focus” and therefore “do not reduce the sheer number of copy-

1 See generally NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHTS PARADOX 80 (2008) (“Copyright began as a narrowly tailored, short-term prerogative designed to promote the printing of original expression. It now threatens to meta- morphose to a rotund, Blackstonian property right . . . . Copyright’s unto- ward expansion betrays copyright’s core principles rather than faithfully translating those principles to new conditions.”); with respect to copyright’s requirement of originality and the concept of the work, see Sir Hugh Lad- die, Copyright: Over-Strength, Over-Regulated, Over-Rated, 18 EUR. IN- TELL. PROP. REV. 253, 257 (1996) (asserting that copyright currently seems to spring up “to protect nearly every creation of the human mind, be it ever so trivial”).